The Media and Sino-American Rapprochement, 1963-1972 by Guolin Yi

Author:Guolin Yi [Yi, Guolin]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Media Studies, History, Asia, China, United States, 20th Century
ISBN: 9780807174661
Google: Z-PcDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: LSU Press
Published: 2020-11-11T05:17:19+00:00

Breakthrough via Secret Diplomacy

While signals through the public media did not produce timely effects, the two governments achieved a breakthrough by communicating through the third party. The 137th Warsaw Talk ended up never occurring after the break-off in February 1970. After that, Nixon and Kissinger tried to reestablish contact with Beijing through different channels. At first, they tried Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, the military attaché in Paris. Between July and September, Walters tried several times to tell his Chinese contact that he had an important message from Washington to Beijing. However, the Chinese official said only that he would inform his government that Walters had a message without making any further response.65 The Paris channel did not produce any result.

It was mainly through the Pakistani channel that Washington and Beijing achieved a breakthrough. As mentioned earlier, on October 25, Nixon had asked Pakistani president Yahya Khan to take his message to Zhou Enlai. Yahya visited China from November 10 to 15. On December 9, the Pakistani ambassador, Agha Hilaly, met with Kissinger and dictated Zhou’s “authoritative personal message” to Nixon. Acknowledging Washington’s past messages from different sources, Zhou emphasized that it was “the first time a proposal has come from a Head through a Head, to a Head” and that he spoke not only for himself but also for Chairman Mao and Lin Biao. He also expressed his willingness to receive a special envoy of Nixon in Beijing to talk about the Taiwan issue.66

On December 16, Kissinger summoned Hilaly and asked him to tell the Chinese that Washington was “prepared to attend a preliminary meeting at an early date” to make arrangements for sending a U.S. delegation to Beijing for higher-level talks. He stated that the talks would not be “confined to the question of Taiwan” but would address all issues concerning the improvement of relations between the two governments. He also said that the Chinese request for withdrawing U.S. forces from Taiwan was not hard to comply with because there were no military forces there except “advisory and training missions.”67

Zhou Enlai’s reply came through Romanian ambassador Corneliu Bogdan on January 11, 1971. Even though he insisted that the U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan was the only “outstanding issue” between the two governments, Zhou wrote that Beijing was ready to receive a U.S. special envoy if the United States had a “desire to settle the issue” and a “proposal for its solution.” More importantly, he added, since President Nixon had visited Bucharest and Belgrade, he would also be welcome to visit Beijing. It was the first time Zhou formally expressed Beijing’s willingness to receive the American president in China. Unfortunately, Nixon and Kissinger interpreted his message as China’s insistence that the U.S. government agree to the Chinese principle on Taiwan as a prerequisite for negotiations. Nixon wrote a note on Kissinger’s memo: “I believe we may appear too eager. Let’s cool it. Wait for them to respond to our initiative.”68 As the two sides were bargaining over the agenda through

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